



Post Quantum Cryptography – A game changer for electronic ID documents?

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Agenda

- Quantum computers and cryptanalysis
- What is Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC)?
- Status of PQC standardization
- Challenges for electronic ID documents
- Recommendations
- Summary



Rapid developments in the field of quantum computers



- **Rapid developments** of quantum computers
- **2016:** 5 Qubits by IBM
- **2019:** 53 Qubits by Google ("quantum supremacy")
- **2025:** 4158 Qubits predicted by IBM
- **~2030:** 1'000'000 Qubits predicted by several companies

- May lead to breakthroughs in Artificial Intelligence, chemical simulation, cryptography and **cryptanalysis**


Are quantum computers fast?

- “**Multiplying of long integers**” – quantum computers are **slow** compared to a “classical” computer
- “**Prime factorization of long integers**” – quantum computers are **very fast** compared to a “classical” computer
- Basis for **cryptanalysis**

Quantum cryptanalysis on a universal quantum computer will heavily affect RSA, ECDSA, ECDH

A universal Quantum Computer will have a game changing effect on the cryptographic security of Identity Documents like eID cards, often with a regular lifetime of 10 years.

There 's still the "physical security" of the document, but i.e. a digital signature will not be safe anymore...



Currently considered safe:

AES-256, SHA512, SHA3-512, ...

Grover's algorithm weakens algorithms with short symmetric keys.

In a quantum world, AES-128 has only 64-bit security


Affected: AES-128, 3DES

Shor's algorithm could break common asymmetric cryptography like RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman.

In a quantum world, i.e. ECC-256 and RSA-3072 have almost no security

Heavily affected: RSA, ECDSA, ECDH

The equation with unknowns: The universal quantum computer – when and how?



- A universal quantum computer provides an adequate **number of logical quantum bits**, excellent execution **quality** and high calculation **speed**
 - ~4100 “logical” Qubits might instantly affect an RSA-2048
 - How many “physical” Qubits will be needed to achieve these “logical” Qubits (catchword: “error correction”)?
- Which **size** will a quantum computer have? A small rack?
Or is a big building needed?



Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC): After algorithm selection, standardization activities continue



- Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to repel cryptanalysis performed by a quantum computer
- PQC is to be deployed in security controllers and is aimed to provide security against attacks with classical and quantum computers
- The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) started in 2015 a **competition** towards a transition to PQC
- First algorithm candidates selected in 2017
- Final candidates have been selected in **2022**
- Development of **draft standards** is ongoing, now available for public comment (including KYBER, DILITHIUM, SPHINCS+)
- **Final standardization** expected 2024 and beyond


Integration in ID standards and adoption of infrastructure is required



- The **selection** of PQC-algorithms is the beginning of standardization
- **Communication protocols need to be adapted and standardized**
- **Documents, infrastructure** including **background systems** need to be upgraded
- **Long transition periods** expected, from a
 - continuing use of **conventional** cryptographic protocols to a
 - use of “**hybrid**” protocols combining conventional cryptography and PQC to a
 - migration to “**PQC-only-powered**” protocols

Challenges of a „PQC-migration“ include crypto agility, a secured PQC-implementation and require learning cycles

- What happens to **issued documents**?
 - **Crypto agility** is helpful
 - **Field-upgrade mechanisms** are helpful
- Challenge is the **implementation of PQC secured** against manipulating, observing and semi invasive attacks
 - Hardware resources help to maintain adequate **transaction performance**
 - Hardware resources support **secured implementations**
- PQC will require **learning cycles** during the evaluation and certification of first implementations
- **Hybrid approaches** (combination of conventional and Post-Quantum Cryptography) reduce risks



There are several approaches towards a quantum computer world - Best is to start preparation right now

- **Short-term ignore the topic?**
 - ... but at a moment in the future, issued documents might be compromised
 - ... probably not an option
- **Reduce the validity of electronic ID-documents?**
 - The shorter the document lifetime, the better the risk position
 - Payment cards are valid for three years, but **Identity documents** have a lifetime of five to **ten years**
 - Reducing document validity is difficult to implement
 - ... probably not an option
- Search for mitigation with a variety of actions
Start the preparation right now!



Mitigation: Start preparation right now



- Start to get the information on PQC
- Start making strategic plans
- Start to work on migration strategies
 - „How to migrate infrastructure?“
 - „How to upgrade documents?“
 - „Which cryptographic infrastructure do I use?“
 - “When to start ...?“
- Reflect on implications of PQC - **Impacts on software & hardware**: increasing key sizes, memory footprints, ...
- **Moving to PQC affects the whole lifecycle** of a document - industrialization, personalization, issuance, operational usage and field updates

Summary and key statements

Start the preparation right now!



- There are **rapid developments** in the field of **quantum computers**
- The **conventional cryptography** deployed in current electronic ID documents and smart cards **will be affected by the cryptanalysis** performed on a future universal quantum computer
- **Post-quantum cryptography** is intended to repel this cryptanalysis, but **standardization and market introduction will take many years**
- **Documents, infrastructure** including **background systems** need to be upgraded, but **long transition periods** expected
- **Start the preparation right now!**

